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Idolization and "Immediate Help!": Campaigning as if Voters Mattered
On July 14, 2004, just nine days after Indonesia's first-ever direct presidential 
election, a massive inferno ripped through the impoverished, gang-infested district of 
Tanah Abang in central Jakarta. Hundreds of dwellings were destroyed and over a 
thousand Jakartans were rendered homeless. While such catastrophes are nothing 
unusual in the nation's chaotic capital, the political responses suggested that some 
interesting changes are afoot in Indonesia's fledgling electoral democracy. The next 
day, presidential frontrunner Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) took a break from 
watching his burgeoning vote totals at the five-star Borobodur Hotel to visit Tanah 
Abang's fire victims. Since he had just clinched pole position in Indonesia's run-off 
presidential election in late September, SBY's public appearance made fantastic copy. 
The handsome former general comforted distraught families, then crept, head and 
shoulders protruding through the sunroof of his campaign minivan, through a swarm 
of star-struck locals. Never mind the knock-off reality-television program screening for 
talent just a few miles away at the swanky Semanggi shopping complex; here, in one of 
Jakarta's least swanky settings, appeared to be the true Indonesian Idol.
1 This article draws on a comparative project with Marc Craighead, conversations and collaboration with 
whom have been invaluable in refining the theoretical arguments presented here. It has also greatly 
benefited from the thoughtful comments of Jamie Davidson, Dirk Tomsa, and an anonymous reviewer at 
Indonesia; the savvy and sensitive editing of Deborah Homsher; and generous fieldwork support from the 
Academy for Educational Development, Emory University, and the Ford Foundation. All translations in 
the essay (along with any errors and all opinions) are the author's.
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Yet candidate SBY was not alone in seeing political opportunities in Tanah Abang's 
tragic blaze. Along one of the sprawling district's main thoroughfares, large banners 
were quickly printed and unfurled offering "Immediate Help!": beds and shelter for up 
to 1,115 souls displaced by the conflagration. The banners were emblazoned with the 
black-and-gold logo of Indonesia's PKS,2 the part-reformist, part-Islamist upstart that 
placed first in Jakarta in April's parliamentary elections. While the personal 
appearance of SBY in Tanah Abang was clearly a novelty, the institutional appearance 
of the PKS in this post-disaster setting was commonplace; the party is by now 
renowned for its efforts to win political converts via grassroots constituency services. 
What was striking, however, was that the party was trying to attract mass support 
immediately after a general election. Five years removed from its next shot at the polls, 
PKS was already preparing the ground for 2009.
These vignettes provide a fitting introduction to the two political forces that have 
most severely disrupted Indonesia's elite politics in its "year of voting frequently": SBY 
the man, and PKS the party. Whether or not one trusts or supports the ultimate 
intentions of these rising political forces, it is important to recognize that both are 
changing the face of Indonesian politics, albeit in quite different ways. SBY is trying to 
capture the presidency through force of personal popularity rather than party 
machinery, a road to power that was blocked in post-Suharto Indonesia until the recent 
introduction of direct presidential elections. PKS's approach to winning power is 
similar only insofar as it also directly and energetically targets ordinary voters. It is 
radically different in the basis of its popular appeal. It would have been out of 
character, for instance, for the party to have tried to woo residents of Tanah Abang 
with a personal appearance by party leader Hidayat Nurwahid, let alone to entertain 
them with a performance by Rhoma Irama, Indonesia's "raja dangdut" 3 and a major 
PKS supporter. By the same token, SBY was not about to offer displaced slum-dwellers 
a place to stay at his hilly retreat in nearby Bogor.
These differences notwithstanding, both SBY the man and PKS the party have 
served as election-year jolts to the two parties that dominate Indonesian politics from 
the national to the local level: Golkar and the PDIP.4 Neither party boasts a figure who 
can match SBY's personal, popular touch; nor can either credibly claim that its party 
machinery is primarily geared, a la PKS, to organizing and cultivating its mass base. 
Rather, both parties almost exclusively serve in the post-Suharto era as institutional 
vehicles for elites to capture power and patronage. More importantly for the argument 
to follow, Golkar and PDIP have taken the lead in devising a system in which these 
parties share power far more than they fight over it. PKS represents a challenge to this 
system insofar as it insists that politics should be about representing the rakyat (the
2 PKS stands for Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or the Prosperous Justice Party. I relegate full party names to 
the footnotes throughout—partly for readability, and partly because the full names convey precious little 
information about the parties themselves.
3 The "king of dangdut," a musical style. His financial backing for PKS is discussed in "'Kami Mengganti 
Kemimpinan Nasional/" TEMPO, April 12-18, 2004, pp. 46-50.
4 Full names are Partai Golkar and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle.
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people) rather than carving up the perquisites of state.5 SBY is probably too much of a 
creature of this system to represent a direct threat to its foundations.6 But he has 
nevertheless presented an immediate and important disruption by shaking up the 
specific elite agreements concerning how power and patronage are to be shared.
For an initial sense of how Golkar and the PDIP have managed to share power, and 
of what kind of status quo these two parties thereby constitute, another local vignette 
might prove instructive. In July 2000, the local legislature in Manado, North Sulawesi, 
held its first election for mayor since the fall of Suharto. Of the forty members doing 
the actual voting, thirteen were from Golkar, and eleven belonged to PDIP. As a naive 
observer scribbling notes in one of the back rows of the gallery, I eagerly anticipated a 
peppery partisan contest—an expectation apparently shared by the festive swarm of 
red-and-black-clad PDIP supporters commingling outside.
Instead, all five nominated tickets matched a Golkar figure with a PDIP counterpart. 
Golkar held the top spot on three tickets while PDIP led two, but this would prove to 
be immaterial. In the first round of voting, the two tickets fronted by PDIP received 
only eight out of forty votes: meaning that at least three of the party's eleven members 
voted for a Golkar candidate for mayor, even though there were still two PDIP 
candidates for mayor in the race. In the second round of voting, one Golkar-PDIP ticket 
soundly defeated another. The final results were announced by a relatively young 
representative from the Islam-based PPP,7 who had implausibly attained the top 
legislative post in a Christian-dominated city. Nearly everyone in the jam-packed hall 
bolted from their seats to try to congratulate the winner. Few observers seemed to be 
grumbling. In short, no one seemed to have lost.
Barely a year later, in the aftermath of President Abdurrahman Wahid's 
impeachment in July 2001, Golkar and PDIP managed to reproduce this cozy style of 
provincial politicking at the national level.8 As I will show below, these parties have 
used the spoils of office—notably cabinet ministries and seats on parliamentary
5 PKS only captured around 8 percent of the national vote, and its Islamist leanings will make it hard for 
the party to expand its base. For purposes of the present analysis, therefore, its significance is more 
stylistic than substantive. If more reformist politics is to emerge in Indonesia, it is more likely to result 
from larger parties emulating PKS's tactics than from PKS seizing power itself. I return to this line of 
argument in the conclusion.
6 Even a cursory biographical sketch shows SBY's longstanding links to Indonesia's political elite. Born in 
1949 in Pancitan, Central Java, SBY went on to finish first in his class at the national military academy in 
1973; hence beginning his meteoric rise as an "intellectual general." His marriage to a daughter of Sarwo 
Edhi Wibowo, one of the leading anti-communist figures in the military during the pogrom of 1965-1966, 
certainly did nothing to slow his ascent under Suharto's New Order. Before his retirement in 2000, his 
military career spanned several academic and training tours in the United States, as well as several tours 
of active duty in East Timor. SBY also held a high-ranking position in the Jakarta command during the 
violent suppression of Megawati's PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party) 
faction in the capital city in July 1996. But he has not been individually implicated in any specific human- 
rights abuses. Thanks to Douglas Kammen for sharing his personal data on SBY. Also see "Profil Susilo B. 
Yudhoyono," Koran Tempo, July 28, 2004.
7 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party.
8 This is by no means to imply that all or most Indonesian localities exhibit cozy politics like Manado's. I 
suggest that Manado's local politics is illustrative of emerging patterns at the national level, not that it is 
broadly representative of existing patterns at the local level. Thanks to Jamie Davidson for his insights on 
this point.
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commissions—to co-opt all significant political parties into what is effectively an 
expansive party cartel. This collusive approach to politics, best expressed 
institutionally in President Megawati's kabinet pelangi (rainbow cabinet), was not an 
entirely new invention; it reflected a return to the collusive logic that informed 
Wahid's first "National Unity Cabinet," founded upon his ascent to the presidency in 
October 1999. Whereas the party cartel's first attempt at power sharing was disrupted 
by Wahid's efforts to reshuffle his cabinet to his own benefit in 2000, this second effort 
stuck. Between August 2001 and March 2004, Indonesian national politics under 
Megawati resembled what one parliamentary faction leader rightly called a "political 
moratorium"9: a term so evocative for Golkar leader Akbar Tandjung, he proudly 
incorporated it into the title of his recent book.10
Such moribund politics was not merely a matter of presidential predilection or the 
limited policy agenda imposed by neoliberal economics and a crushing foreign debt. It 
was intimately connected with the structure o f the coalition that had seized power. Because 
this vast coalition essentially swallowed all political opposition whole, neither the 
Megawati administration nor its coalition partners has been under any pressure 
whatsoever to perform. Even if voters were unhappy with Megawati's performance, 
their only viable electoral alternatives appeared to be parties that were part and parcel 
of her party cartel. While most critics of Megawati's power-sharing formula have 
emphasized its negative effects on government effectiveness and performance, the fact 
that such a coalitional arrangement stifles democratic accountability by limiting 
effective voter choice has gone relatively unmentioned.
Before the April 2004 parliamentary elections, it would have been tempting to 
conclude that the Megawati administration's accountability to the people had been 
"strangled" rather than merely "stifled." Yet despite a lack of appealing and well- 
organized alternatives, Indonesian voters managed to register their discontent with the 
party cartel by giving all five major parties a lower vote share than they had received in 
1999. Megawati's PDIP suffered far and away the largest losses, slipping from 34 
percent to just under 20 percent; but Golkar, PPP, as well as Amien Rais's PAN and 
former President Wahid's PKB suffered more minor setbacks as well.11 PDIP voters did 
not swing to the party's coalition partners. In Suzaina Kadir's apt phrase, they "swung 
out" instead.12 Rather than realignment, the 2004 parliamentary vote produced 
dealignment. The two biggest beneficiaries were the PKS and SBY's electoral vehicle, 
the Democrat Party (PD), which won nearly 15 percent of the total vote combined.
The sudden success of SBY's party in April's parliamentary contest foreshadowed 
his first-place finish in July's direct presidential vote, which made the retired general a 
huge favorite to defeat President Megawati in the second and final round of voting in 
September. Might this mean major alterations to the coalitional structure that 
Megawati has presided over as well? If so, what kind of structure would be likely to
9 "Format Kabinet Hampir Final," Kompas, July 28, 2001, p. 11.
10 Akbar Tandjung, Moratorium Politik Menuju Rekonsiliasi Nasional (Jakarta: Golkar Press, 2003).
11 PAN is the Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party. PKB stands for Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, or National Awakening Party.
12 Comments at public forum, Asia Research Institute (ARI), Singapore, April 28, 2004.
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replace it? What would be the conceivable consequences for democratic accountability? 
And would a Megawati victory likely mean more of the same?
My primary aim in the following sections is to propose and elaborate a new 
analytical and theoretical framework for post-Suharto party politics. This will 
hopefully serve to make these questions a bit less intractable. In short, I argue that 
Indonesia's post-authoritarian politics has been caught until now in an accountability 
trap. This trap is structural and systematic, and not merely the sum of strategic 
decisions by individual party elites. Such individual strategies are more likely to 
determine which part of the accountability trap Indonesia winds up mired in after the 
2004 elections, rather than whether or not Indonesia actually remains trapped. 
Escaping this trap altogether will probably require changes in patterns of mass political 
mobilization or informal norms of elite interaction that are by no means unthinkable, 
but also by no means imminent. On the other hand, the 2004 elections have cast some 
important beams of light into an otherwise murky political process, with potentially 
liberating—if perhaps unintended—consequences for national politics in the years to 
come.
Theorizing the Trap: Collusive Democracy vs. Delegative Democracy
It is an article of faith among proponents of democracy that elections force 
politicians to compete for public support. It is—no exaggeration—the whole point. 
Shrewd observers recognize that candidates may compete by bribing, stealing, and 
even killing, thereby undermining the presumed benefits of the electoral exercise. But 
political scientists' expectation that elections will produce party competition remains 
perhaps even more unshakable than economists' assumption that markets produce 
competition among firms. Yet in both fields of endeavor, cartels can emerge to stifle 
competition instead.
In economics, cartels differ from markets in that they crush competitors and 
strangle potential new market entrants. In politics, cartels differ from coalitions in that 
they co-opt all major political parties into a vast national alliance, marginalizing small 
outsider parties in the process. While this may be ideal for stability, it is deeply 
problematic for popular representation. Leaders can only be held accountable if they 
can be replaced—and as the old saw goes, you can't beat something with nothing. 
Richard Katz and Peter Mair recognized this phenomenon nearly a decade ago, in a 
trenchant critique of the Putnam-esque argument that European political parties were 
becoming weaker because of their attenuating ties to civil society. Instead, Katz and 
Mair noted that parties were drawing succor and strength from "an ever closer 
symbiosis between parties and the state."13 The defining feature of such symbiosis was 
that "colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state 
(the party state) to ensure their own collective survival."14
13 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy," Party 
Politics 1,1 (1995): 6.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
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They dub these "cartel parties." In the European context, Katz and Mair saw this 
development as extremely problematic for democratic accountability. Back when 
parties still drew more resources and support from society than the state, they argued,
. . . not only were there some parties that were clearly "in" while others were 
clearly "out," but the fear of being thrown out of office by the voters was also 
seen as the major incentive for politicians to be responsive to the citizenry. In the 
cartel model, on the other hand, none of the major parties is ever definitively 
"out." As a result, there is an increased sense in which electoral democracy may 
be seen as a means by which the rulers control the ruled, rather than the other 
way around . . . Moreover, as the distinction between parties in office and those 
out of office becomes more blurred, the degree to which voters can punish parties 
even on the basis of generalized dissatisfaction is reduced."15
I would submit that this is a relatively fair description of Indonesian party politics 
both under Abdurrahman Wahid's National Unity Cabinet (October 1999-August 
2000), as well as Megawati Sukarnoputri's longer-lasting rainbow cabinet (August 
2001-March 2004). The purpose of casting Indonesia's recent experience in such a 
comparative light is not to impose a European straitjacket on the analysis of Indonesian 
politics. Rather, it is to recognize that in Indonesia, as much as in Europe, local politics 
contains elements of the general as well as the particular. Not only will such explicit 
theorizing hopefully enhance prospects for comparative analysis; it also provides a 
useful basis for critiques of culturalist, often essentialist, arguments that Indonesia's 
exceptional recent levels of elite collaboration are deeply rooted in national political 
character. Nowhere is this more boldly expressed than in Megawati's assertion that 
hers is a "kabinet gotong-royong/’16 rather than a transparent attempt by elite politicians 
to dominate Indonesia's lucrative patronage networks with political impunity.
And it is indeed in the cabinet where Indonesia's party cartels have found their 
clearest institutional expression. Rather than thinking of Indonesia's cabinet as a body 
of advisers and executors of presidential policy and commands, it is more accurate to 
picture it as a gilded bridge between parliament and the presidency, providing a 
fortunate few with access to the bounteous patronage resources of the state executive. 
In the local parlance, cabinet seats vary widely in how basah, or "wet" they might be; 
but all cabinet positions provide greater patronage opportunities than run-of-the-mill 
parliamentary seats. Although there are signs that the imbalance between the cabinet 
and parliament is narrowing—and not in the direction reformers would 
prefer—politicians appear to remain especially obsessed with seizing the fasilitas that 
come from controlling a ministry: i.e. the chauffeured government car, the larger office, 
the higher salary, and the opportunity to appoint more personal staff. In less
15 Ibid., p. 22.
16 Gotong-royong may be loosely translated as "mutual assistance," and refers to ostensibly timeless forms 
of cooperation at the village level. Yet it connotes shared poverty and sacrifice—"a general ethos of 
selflessness and concern for the common good," writes John Bowen—making it a spectacularly 
inappropriate descriptor of the kind of cooperation that actually occurs in Indonesian cabinet politics. See 
John R. Bowen, "On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia," Journal o f Asian 
Studies 45,3 (May 1986): 545-561.
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remunerative terms, cabinet seats provide politicians with increased prestige and 
decision-making authority as well.17
It is harder to prove, but nearly universally assumed, that cabinet seats also 
provide ministers with direct access to far grander patronage treasures. Most 
obviously, playing a gate-keeping role in regulating particularly basah sectors such as 
finance, energy, industry, transportation, and state-owned enterprises invests ministers 
with potentially valuable personal authority over the commanding heights of the 
national economy. Even a ministry one would presume to be comparatively kering 
(dry), the Department of Religion, has been reputed to be highly lucrative for its 
ministers. The trick: to skim the interest from mandatory deposits of those preparing to 
perform the hadj.18
Of far more gravity is the chronic problem of "non-budgetary funds" held by 
government ministries, a major fiscal hangover from the Suharto years. Opinions differ 
over how much money is stored in such accounts, and over how much effective access 
ministers have to these funds. Yet foreign economic advisers to the Indonesian 
bureaucracy have generally surmised—drawing on the pessimistic assessments of local 
economists—that there could conceivably be enough money stashed away in these off- 
budget accounts to pay off Indonesia's entire national debt, should those funds ever be 
recovered.19 Even if this represents a wild overestimation of the problem, it is clear that 
cabinet seats provide opportunities for far greater private remuneration than the cushy 
fasilitas that officially accompany the position.
It should hardly be surprising, then, that both Wahid and Megawati have struggled 
mightily in their efforts to construct cabinets that could assuage all parties' demands. 
Once these cabinets have been formed, however, political infighting has essentially 
stopped. The year of political instability leading up to Wahid's impeachment in July 
2001 was so unstable precisely because the president refused to abide by the quid pro 
quo that accompanied his election by parliament: We give you the presidency, and you 
give us the cabinet. Partisanship practically grinds to a halt once a cabinet is formed, 
because winning cabinet seats is the primary partisan task of party leaders.
It may well be denied that Wahid's removal was caused by any clash of deep 
political structures, rather than resulting simply from the foolishness of a particular 
individual. Alternatively, one might cast Wahid's Quixotic attempts at preserving a 
powerful presidency in a more culturalist light. If party cartels find echoes in particular 
Indonesian notions of gotong-royong, a president's desire to rule absolutely might 
reflect the lingering influence of Javanese notions of power.20 The notion that Javanese 
think of power as zero-sum fits rather well with Wahid's style of rule, but quite badly 
with Megawati's. Cultural notions of mutual assistance and zero-sum power might not
17 Interview with Golkar parliamentarian Burhan Magenda, Jakarta, July 16, 2004.
18 As of 2001, such deposits had to be in place for a full year before one's departure to Mecca, but the 
Department paid no interest on such deposits. Personal communication with Ben Olken, August 2001.
19 Interview with Douglas Todd, KPMG/ Barents Consulting, Agency for Fiscal Analysis, Ministry of 
Finance, Jakarta, August 2001.
20 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, 
ed. Claire Flolt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
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be irrelevant to recent patterns in Indonesian politics, but it is hard to see how they can 
be considered determinative either.
In point of fact, for all the understandable attention given to Wahid's wily and 
mercurial personality, we might gain greater analytic traction by considering his 
actions as an instance of a very common political phenomenon: presidential efforts to 
gain personal domination in new, fragile democracies. No region has experienced 
more instances of this syndrome than Latin America; and no scholar has tried harder to 
theorize it, understandably enough, than Guillermo O'Donnell.21 He begins his 
analysis by drawing a clear distinction between "horizontal" and "vertical" 
accountability which, I submit, proves quite useful in the Indonesian context. Vertical 
accountability refers to a reciprocal relationship linking masses and elites, a bond most 
typically established via the ballot box. If government officials live in fear that 
dissatisfaction from below could lead to their dismissal, and respond by devising 
strategies to win broad popular appeal, then vertical accountability can be said to be 
strong, or at least not entirely absent.
O'Donnell's central argument is that Latin American presidential systems have 
been very effective at producing vertical accountability, but quite ineffective at 
generating horizontal accountability. This refers to a president's relations with other 
institutions of state: i.e. parliament, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and political parties. 
In O'Donnell's view, the main scourge of Latin American democracy has been 
presidents who see themselves as sentinels of the common national will, and thus 
refuse to be constrained by constitutional checks and balances at the elite level. 
Parliaments, parties, and courts are at best ignored, or at worst disbanded. Democratic 
legitimacy comes to rest on the continued popularity of a single strong-willed 
individual—as fragile a political reed as can possibly be imagined.
Systems exhibiting weak horizontal accountability are dubbed delegative democracies 
in O'Donnell's work. "Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins 
election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit," he 
explains.22 Such systems have been especially liable to emerge in regimes 
simultaneously facing a turbulent transition from authoritarianism and a serious 
economic crisis: two conditions that Indonesia sadly fits rather well. Even after a 
democracy becomes relatively far removed from the authoritarian period, "crisis 
generates a strong sense of urgency and provides fertile terrain for unleashing the 
delegative propensities that may be present in a given country."23 In Indonesia's case, 
the presidential domination that defined Suharto's New Order had barely been 
tempered when Wahid willfully attempted—albeit in the guise of a delegative 
democrat rather than a brutal autocrat—to recapture it.
Both elements of what I call Indonesia's accountability trap are now in place. Rather 
than insisting that Indonesian politics is overwhelmingly inclined to resemble either 
O'Donnell's "delegative democracy" or what Katz and Mair might call "collusive 
democracy," I argue that the best way to situate contemporary Indonesian politics in a 
suitable theoretical framework is to pit O'Donnell and Katz and Mair against each
21 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal o f Democracy 5,1 (1994): 55-69.
22 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
23 Ibid., p. 65.
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other. O'Donnell assumes that any democracy with strong horizontal accountability is 
a "representative democracy." But this fails to recognize Katz and Mair's vital point 
that vertical accountability can be snuffed out in electoral settings as well, as parties 
strangle popular representation by constructing party cartels.24 By the same token, 
O'Donnell's insistence on the importance of strong parties and an effective parliament 
in making democracy function serves as a useful addendum to Katz and Mair's 
conception of collusive democracy.
This is not to suggest that a more fully representative form of popular rule cannot 
emerge in Indonesia, in which governments in power cater to the needs of the mass 
population, while respecting the parallel authority of parties, parliaments, and courts. 
Indeed, this is precisely the standard to which elected officials in Indonesia should be 
held. Yet it would be heroically optimistic to view such an outcome as looming on the 
political horizon. The blame for this does not rest primarily with Indonesian voters, 
who have been given a limited menu of credible options, yet have managed to strike a 
significant blow against the parties that had formed an ineffective and unresponsive 
cartel. In doing so, it seems reasonable to estimate that roughly half of the voters who 
bolted "the big five" went for PKS, which campaigns (especially in Jakarta) as if it 
aspires to introduce a much more representative pattern of politics. But another half 
voted for SBY, who to date has acted as if he will either sustain the practice of collusive 
democracy that has generally served him quite well, or else try, by force of personality 
and popularity, to do what Wahid could not: install delegative democracy in its place. 
Indonesia's accountability trap has thus been set.
Origins of Collusive Democracy: From Competitive Elections to the Party Cartel
Having introduced this theoretical framework, I hope now to show its usefulness 
in grasping the superficially kacau (chaotic) politics of elite coalitions in Indonesia over 
the past five years. The analysis begins with the fall of President B. J. Habibie, 
Suharto's hand-picked successor, in October 1999. That was when the diverse 
collection of newly elected politicos and New Order holdovers comprising Indonesia's 
parliament were forced to figure out how to run a government, without Golkar 
hegemony making it all rather simple.
For an electoral democracy emerging from such a long bout of authoritarian rule, 
Indonesia enjoyed a relatively functional and consolidated party system. This 
facilitated the construction of a new governing coalition. The top five parties had 
garnered over 85 percent of the votes in the June 1999 parliamentary election,
24 Parties tend to emphasize the sharing of patronage over the competition for mass support when "each 
side recognizes that it cannot destroy the other . . .  In the case of political parties, total victory is out of the 
question when each party enjoys a solid base of support within some segment of the electorate." See 
Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), p. 7. In the Indonesian context, this demands critical attention to the continuing 
relevance of the politics of aliran, or social cleavages. The stronger such cleavages, the less likely parties 
will be to compete for support outside their own aliran bailiwick, and the more likely party cartels will 
emerge and endure. For the classic treatment of aliran, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion o f Java (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976). For a sophisticated recent analysis arguing that aliran politics still 
counts, even if it is clearly not all that counts, see Dwight Y. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions 
and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).
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Indonesia's first truly open and competitive election since 1955. PDIP, bolstered by 
Megawati's image as a prime victim of New Order repression (and, ironically, the 
inherited party apparatus of Suharto's puppet PDI), had come in first with 34 percent 
of the votes. Golkar was second with 22 percent, while three parties with a more 
Islamic flavor—PKB, PPP, and PAN—trotted across the finish line with 13 percent, 11 
percent, and 7 percent, respectively (but exact totals, as we shall soon see, would prove 
to be irrelevant). The Indonesian military, or TNI,25 retained between 7-8 percent of the 
seats on an appointive basis, thus providing the country's strongest institution with a 
firm parliamentary toehold to complement its coercive and commercial might.
As party leaders began selecting a new president and vice-president, they enjoyed 
several options in constructing a working majority. The easiest option, mathematically, 
was a broadly nationalist coalition comprising PDIP, Golkar, and, for some added 
coalitional ballast, perhaps PKB and/or TNI. This would have produced a government 
with some measure of ideological compatibility, while leaving a modest opposition in 
the parliament. A second option, clearly preferable from a democratic perspective, 
would have been for a more reformist coalition to emerge from those political parties 
led by figures who played somewhat oppositional roles during the late New Order 
period: Megawati's PDIP, Wahid's PKB, and Amien Rais's PAN. If this coalition could 
have inspired more reformist elements in PPP to take over the party at the expense of 
its old guard, thus leaving Golkar, TNI, and a few small Islamic parties in the 
opposition, it would have served as an inspiring success in the spirit of the broad- 
based reformasi movement that overturned Suharto in May 1998. Having briefly united 
to issue the reform-minded "Ciganjur Declaration" in November 1998, the triumvirate 
of Megawati, Wahid, and Amien had at least some experience of collaboration that 
could have conceivably carried over into a new governing coalition.26
Both of these coalitional options failed to materialize. First, PDIP failed to take the 
lead in crafting either of these winning coalitions, letting the initiative slip to a new 
"Central Axis"27 of Islam-oriented parties, loosely led by Amien Rais. These parties 
were united by their shared desire to deny the presidency to Megawati, whom they 
saw as a woman with weak Islamic credentials. But they were in no position to build a 
winning coalition on their own. What thus emerged was a loose anti-Megawati 
coalition comprising the Central Axis, PKB, Golkar, and TNI, in support of Wahid as a 
compromise presidential candidate. Although Wahid's PKB barely held 10 percent of 
all seats in parliament, he defeated Megawati in the presidential vote, leaving 
Megawati and her party's 30 percent share of parliament (temporarily) holding the 
bag.
Even with PDIP denied what seemed its rightful victory, it was still not structurally 
essential that a "National Unity Cabinet" be formed, rather than a cabinet based on a 
narrower nationalist or reformist coalition. If any party besides PDIP had a foot in both 
of those camps, and was thus in a position to negotiate such a limited coalitional
25 Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or the Indonesian armed forces. After the military and police (Polisi 
Republik Indonesia, or Polri) were officially divided, the parliamentary fraction became known as 
TNI/Polri.
26 Yogyakarta's Sultan Hamengku Buwono X was a fourth signatory to the Ciganjur Declaration.
27 Poros Tengah. Again, we see the name of a political group failing to convey any clear political purpose.
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structure, it was Wahid's PKB. But for a second time, it was not to be. As the focus 
turned from the presidency to the vice-presidency, Wahid found himself buffeted by 
pressures both from the masses and from within the elite. At the mass level, PDIP 
supporters rioted, most severely in Jakarta and Bali, in understandable outrage at 
Megawati's having been denied the presidency. Against such a backdrop, it became 
politically untenable to deny Megawati the vice-presidency as well. With PKB and 
PDIP ensconced atop the government structure, party elites had yet a third opportunity 
to construct either a limited nationalist or reformist coalition, this time via its formation 
of Indonesia's first democratic cabinet in nearly half a century.
It was at this juncture that things fell apart—or, more precisely, came together—in 
a most instructive way. Although Wahid ostensibly enjoyed the right to appoint his 
own cabinet, this privilege was either willingly surrendered or forcibly yanked away. 
As noted earlier, it appeared that Wahid had agreed to a quid pro quo in which the 
price of the presidency was a cabinet he could not control. Rather than the struggle for 
the cabinet resembling an orderly cafeteria line in which the president and vice- 
president enjoyed ultimate authority over who got fed what, the process descended 
into more of a mad and disordered collective plunge into an open feeding trough. 
Backroom negotiations among all five major faction leaders (Wahid, Megawati, Amien 
Rais, Golkar's Akbar Tandjung, and TNI head Wiranto) produced a cabinet that had to 
be expanded from twenty-five to thirty-five members to dissipate disputes over each 
group's share of the pie.28 The president tried to put a brave face on the process, 
insisting that "the theme of the cabinet is national unity." At the same time, however, 
Wahid hinted at the contentiousness of the bargaining process, noting that the other 
four faction leaders would act as "guarantors" of their cabinet nominees in case they 
"misbehaved."29
As the post-Suharto/Habibie government struggled to find its feet, no party or 
group of parties enjoyed the necessary confidence to impose defeat on any other 
faction; if holding seats in the parliament, but not the cabinet, can truly be construed as 
"defeat." Everyone was in, and no one was out. Even parties as minuscule as the PBB 
and PK,30 which each won less than 2 percent of the parliamentary vote, managed to 
secure a cabinet seat apiece by situating themselves in the Amien-led Central Axis. 
From the election of the president through the naming of the cabinet, the entire 
coalition-building process showed little concern with issues of party compatibility, 
electoral proportionality, or the importance of retaining some significant opposition to 
preserve vertical accountability and voter choice in elections to come.
How this result was achieved was as significant as the result itself. Although the 
National Unity Cabinet itself lasted only six months in its original, purely cartelized 
form, and less than a year overall, the process of selecting it appeared to have powerful 
path-dependent consequences. Specifically, informal norms have arisen in which a
28 One Golkar legislator, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, even floated the suggestion of anointing a second vice- 
president, so Megawati's victory would not come at the expense of PPP leader Hamzah Haz. See "What 
went on behind the scenes," Business Times (Singapore), October 22,1999.
29 "Gus Dur forms 'compromise' Cabinet," The Jakarta Post, October 27,1999.
30 Partai Bulan Bintang, or Star and Crescent Party, and Partai Keadilan, or Justice Party. The PK is the 
forerunner to the PKS, discussed in the introduction.
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small and familiar handful of party and military elites settle their respective fractions' 
recurrent distributional disputes entirely in opaque rather than transparent settings. 
"Politics takes place entirely outside the public domain," as Benny Subianto more 
elegantly put it.31
The magic word is "entirely." All political systems are largely driven by backroom 
maneuvers, but what is striking in the Indonesian context is the abject unwillingness of 
ostensibly democratic political elites to discuss even the general gist of their political 
discussions after they reenter the public sphere. Even when top politicos hold 
discussions under conditions that are unmistakably connected to concerns with 
coalitional politics, they almost universally emerge with the claim that the meeting was 
only a silaturahmi (a friendly social call), and not a political negotiation at all. To be 
sure, voters and journalists should expect at times to have their gaze evaded; but they 
should not expect to have their intelligence so chronically insulted. Yet since all 
political elites behave in this manner, voters cannot punish any particular party for 
failing to be transparent in its elite dealings.
Of more significance for the analysis here, however, is that the National Unity 
Cabinet (1) reduced pressure on the government to respond to societal pressures, and 
(2) threatened to stifle voter choice if it survived until the 2004 election. Indonesians 
could not support the opposition because there was no opposition to support.32 Even 
those voters savvy enough to know of some tiny party that had not been vacuumed 
into the vortex of the party cartel would have had little reason to believe that their vote 
might play even a small part in displacing an elite party figure such as Akbar 
Tandjung or Megawati. Having made their personal positions effectively impenetrable 
atop Indonesia's steep political pyramid, party elites had virtually escaped vertical 
accountability within a few short months of the country's first post-Suharto election.
Escaping Horizontal Accountability: Cabinets and Confrontation under Wahid
Katz and Mair would find much that is familiar in the preceding narrative. For 
nearly six months, Indonesia's cabinet was colonized by a quintessential party cartel. 
But in April 2000, President Wahid began making maneuvers that would seem much 
more familiar to O'Donnell. Chafing under the horizontal constraints imposed by his 
National Unity Cabinet, Wahid expelled two leading economic ministers, one each 
from Golkar (Jusuf Kalla) and PDIP (Laksamana Sukardi), and replaced them with 
reputed personal loyalists (Rozy Munir and Luhut Panjaitan). In so doing, Wahid not 
only targeted Indonesia's two largest political parties; he hit them where it hurt most, 
depriving them of especially basah positions atop economic ministries. The president's 
effort to overturn collusive democracy by flirting with delegative democracy had 
commenced.
31 Personal communication, July 2004.
32 Since groups in civil society lack the capacity to impose accountability on incumbents by threatening 
their removal, they can only oppose certain policies, not the government per se. For a discussion of this 
more limited type of opposition played by NGOs, the press, and students in Indonesia, see Zaenuddin 
HM, Prospek Gerakan Reformasi: Dalam Era Pemerintahan Gus Dur-Megawati (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo, 2001).
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In retrospect, it is easy to say that Wahid's gambit was bound to fail. Yet he was 
able to use the power of the Indonesian presidency to put party elites on the defensive 
for over a year, in spite of his weak position in parliament. Crafting an effective 
parliamentary response was difficult for two reasons. First, Wahid may have been 
boldly transgressing emergent informal norms by reshuffling his cabinet at will, but he 
was not violating any formal rules. This was grudgingly admitted by the chairman of 
PDIP's parliamentary faction, Dimyati Hartono, who, while accepting the legality of 
Wahid's dual sackings, complained that "it was unethical for him to have done so 
without consulting their political affiliations."33
Second, it would be no small feat to transform the anti-Megawati coalition that had 
installed Wahid into an anti-Wahid coalition that would, via impeachment, install 
Megawati. Given the tortured character of the impeachment process under Indonesia's 
constitution, even parliament's most reputedly savvy operator, Akbar Tandjung, was 
initially uncertain of what angle to take. "We might withdraw ministers who come 
from Golkar," he insisted. "But that's a last resort," he meekly concluded.34 The next 
day, Akbar renewed his expression of frustration, but retracted his bluff: "We will not 
withdraw our cadres from the cabinet."35 While Golkar refused to cut off its nose to 
spite its face, Finance Minister Bambang Sudibyo, representing PAN, simply seemed 
pleased to have avoided the axe. "I'm just following the boss's decision," he shrugged. 
"I can work with anyone."36
But parliamentary leaders were only willing to work with a president who would 
work with them. This meant sharing executive power, and nothing less. Unwilling to 
pull their members from the cabinet in a self-defeating protest, party leaders tried, 
rather limp-wristedly, to force Wahid to explain his cabinet reshuffle before 
parliament. Flaunting his brightening delegative plumage, Wahid denied that 
parliament had the right to question him except during parliament's annual special 
session. But by early August 2000, when the annual session came due, the 
parliamentary cat finally got its paws on the presidential mouse, amending the 
constitution to make it easier to summon the president to confront articles of 
impeachment at any time. Nevertheless, it was still fair to conclude that parliament 
ultimately "did not succeed in doing what it had been most determined to 
accomplish—to emasculate Wahid, or at least to force him to respect its component 
parties' wishes."37
Later in August, elite conflict escalated dramatically. Once again, ground zero was 
the cabinet. Wahid reshuffled it wholesale, replacing the thirty-five-member National 
Unity Cabinet with a twenty-six-member cabinet nicknamed "All the President's 
Men." The frustrations that led the president to take such precipitous action were 
similar to those that inspire the presidential shirking of horizontal accountability 
elsewhere. "I feel sometimes I have no control over my government," Wahid lamented.
33 "Parties Warn of Desertion from Cabinet," The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2000.
34 Ibid.
35 "House to Question President over his Cabinet Reshuffle," The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2000.
36 "Gus Dur defends Cabinet reshuffle," The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2000.
37 Jose Manuel Tesoro and Dewi Loveard, "Blind Man's Bluff," Asiaweek, September 1, 2000.
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"I don't get a response from anyone. I need a way to assert my authority."38 Golkar 
parliamentarian Muchyar Yara was remarkably and refreshingly candid in responding 
to his party's expulsion from the cabinet: "I'm really disappointed because I wasn't 
named labor minister as Gus Dur39 promised," he moaned. "But this is his loss. In the 
future we'll be more critical."40
"Vindictive" might be a more fitting term. With no cabinet posts remaining to 
temper their appetite for confrontation, party elites quickly announced plans to 
investigate Wahid's role in two political-finance scandals: a US$4 million diversion of 
funds from Bulog41 by the president's personal masseur, and a US$2 million personal 
gift to the president from the Sultan of Brunei. Wahid pleaded ignorance in the first 
case and claimed noble intentions in the latter. These were arguably stouter defenses 
than the ones offered by Akbar Tandjung in his own criminal trials related to illegal 
diversion of funds. For now, however, the pressing need is not to debate the 
president's sins. Rather, it is necessary, first, to note the rapidity with which Wahid 
was transformed in party elites' eyes from a worthy compromise president to an 
intolerable and impeachable rogue. And second, one should recognize this 
transformation's intimate connection to the president's emboldened efforts, in 
structural terms, to replace collusive democracy with delegative democracy.
Throughout a tiresomely legalistic, year-long struggle, the anti-Wahid coalition in 
parliament remained effectively in lockstep. This is all the more impressive (in the 
normatively neutral sense of the term) when one considers that individual 
parliamentarians would have presumably faced powerful incentives to break ranks 
and cut side-deals with the president, to regain access to patronage lost. Indeed, at the 
onset of full-blown konfrontasi kabinet, political researcher Irman G. Lanti opined that 
Wahid appeared to have gained the upper hand. 'The situation may have slipped out 
of the control of party leaders—reflected by a new acronym, KISS (ke istana sendiri- 
sendiri)—or, 'going to Istana on his or her own.'"42 Yet such defections from the party 
cartel's shoulder-to-shoulder opposition to the President proved to be the exception, 
not the norm.
The Battle Backstage: Informal Norms and Networks in the Cartel's Resurgence
This issue of party defections raises a broader theoretical and comparative 
question, which helps set the stage for the discussion to follow. From a comparative 
perspective, it is worth considering why Wahid's maneuvers did not lead to the sort of 
rampant party-switching that has been routine in the Philippines and Thailand. Stated 
theoretically rather than comparatively, the impeachment of Wahid stands as a 
fascinating test of arguments regarding the relative significance of formal rules and
38 John McBeth, "Military Manoeuvres," Ear Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 2000.
39 Wahid's widely used nickname.
40 Tesoro and Loveard, "Blind Man's Bluff."
41 The Board of Logistics (Bulog) has long been entrusted with maintaining price stability in politically 
strategic commodities. It has also long served as a stupendous source of discretionary finance for 
presidential favorites.
42 Irman G. Lanti, "Gus Dur's Line-up Pits Cabinet against House," Straits Times, August 29, 2000.
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informal norms in producing political outcomes. It might well be that Indonesia's 
combination of proportional representation and closed party-list voting (known 
colloquially as kucing dalam karung, or "cat in a sack") generates greater party cohesion 
than the more candidate-oriented electoral systems of Thailand or the Philippines.43 If 
so, we should probably expect to see important changes in patterns of coalition 
formation manifested in the 2004 elections, given the country's recent switch to direct 
presidential elections and at least limited open-list party voting.
A third, intermediate possibility is that Indonesia's coalitional politics is being 
shaped by informal networks more than informal norms per se. As already noted, the 
dagang sapi (literally "cow-trading") that surrounded the formation of the Wahid- 
Megawati government in October 1999 involved a very small number of players, 
whose backgrounds crisscrossed party lines. Adopting a somewhat longer view, one 
might trace the origins of this cartel to the broad anti-Habibie coalition that emerged in 
late 1998 and early 1999. The first step came with the pro-reform "Ciganjur 
Declaration" delivered by Megawati, Wahid, Amien Rais, and the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta in November 1998. Just two months later, military commander Wiranto 
took the lead in reconvening these figures in a "Ciganjur-Plus" meeting that subtly 
insinuated the military into the coalition against Habibie. Most fascinating of all, as Jun 
Honna has noted, Wiranto entrusted the clandestine preparation of the meeting to the 
current rising star of Indonesian politics: none other than SBY.44 Foreshadowing our 
analysis just a bit, one can draw a straight line from Ciganjur-Plus in January 1999 to 
four of the five presidential candidates in July 2004. And a fifth Ciganjur-Plus 
participant, Wahid, was disqualified from the most recent presidential sweepstakes 
due to his virtual blindness and precarious cardiac health.
Yet the anti-Wahid coalition could not simply be a straightforward sequel to the 
anti-Habibie coalition of two years before. Most obviously, if also most implausibly, 
Wahid himself no longer served as the unifying figure at the center of the coalition, 
circa 1999, but as its common enemy, circa 2001. Former TNI chief Wiranto, the 
mastermind of Ciganjur-Plus, had been sacked by Wahid and was keeping a low 
profile. But as the President increasingly ignored his former partners in the cartel, 
party leaders shifted their energies from sharing power to seizing it. This took the form 
of a series of memoranda that tightened the constitutional noose around Wahid's neck. 
Given the cartel's incredible breadth across parties, it was ideally structured for this 
line of attack—throughout the year-long process, only Wahid's own PKB tried to stop 
or slow the grinding wheels of impeachment. But this extraordinary level of 
parliamentary cohesion across parties, even as the coalition's raison d'etre apparently 
experienced a 180 degree shift, is still a puzzle to be explained.
I would argue that the cartel's robustness throughout impeachment can best be 
explained by the fact that its core mission, contrary to all appearances, had not 
changed in the slightest. The cartel had come together in 1999 to seize the cabinet; it
43 A more sociological view would be that aliran politics stifles party-switching. This is especially 
noteworthy in the case of Wahid and his PKB, which has strong aliran roots in its NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) 
popular base. More broadly, if identity cleavages prevent any single party from winning majority support 
under democratic conditions, no party can become inordinately attractive to opportunistic party-crashers.
44 Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 
170.
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had taken mortal offense in 2000 at its expulsion from the cabinet; and it needed to 
come together again in 2001 to regain the cabinet. To some degree, new means 
(impeachment) were required to fulfill these familiar ends. But at a deeper level, 
removing Wahid was the same sort of collective-action problem that party leaders had 
already faced in removing Habibie, sidelining Megawati, anointing Wahid, and 
constructing the National Unity Cabinet. In these processes, networks had been formed 
and experience had been gained. What the cartel knew best was how to share power, 
and the critical point about impeachment was that it was perfectly tailored to this 
emergent modus vivendi. One might say that in the first several years of post-Suharto 
politics, these patterns of cross-party interaction have become more institutionalized 
than Indonesia's parties themselves.
Based on the precedent of Habibie's defeat in 1999, every party that joined in the 
effort to remove Wahid in 2001 would expect to be included in the new Megawati 
coalition. This inspired party elites to begin informal negotiations over the format of 
the first Megawati cabinet long before Wahid had been officially removed. Impeachment 
was not about Wahid or Megawati per se, but about parliamentary party leaders' 
shared interest in replacing a delegative democrat with a collusive democrat. To 
bolster the cartel's confidence that Megawati would be the latter and not the former, 
she and her kingpin husband Taufik Kiemas deputized two PDIP leaders to organize 
new channels for cross-party dialogue. First, Arifin Panigoro established the Forum 
Lintas Fraksi (Cross-Fraction Forum) to coordinate party preparations for amending 
the constitution, and thus to clear the road to impeachment before the August 2000 
special parliamentary session. This parliamentary body became a political force after 
Wahid's August reshuffle, when it began coordinating party positions on 
investigations into the President's "Buloggate" and "Bruneigate" scandals.45
More informal cross-party channels were opened by Kwik Kian Gie, a former 
coordinating minister for economics and a staunch PDIP loyalist. His working group 
became known as the "November 11 Caucus," referring to its formation nearly nine 
months before Wahid's ultimate removal from office. Given the opaque nature of such 
informal politics, it is difficult to say how heavily the November 11 Caucus's 
discussions were initially weighted toward the future structure of the cabinet, rather 
than the more immediate problem of crafting a common lintas-fraksi stance on 
parliamentary memoranda. As of early April 2001, TEMPO reported:
Besides their official faction meetings, there are informal inter-faction meetings. 
Always left out are the president's National Awakening Party (PKB) and its scant 
allies. Sometimes these combined anti-Wahid forces adopt the banner of Kwik's 
November 11 Caucus. Sometimes they just lobby among themselves. And their 
attitude is very clear. They want to get the second memorandum out of the way, 
then push for a special session.46
Before pushing confrontation to the brink with a second and final memorandum in 
late May 2001, however, the party cartel offered Wahid a predictable compromise: 
"Perhaps authority over appointing members of the cabinet should not be wholly held
45 "Srimulat Meriahkan Syukuran Lintas Fraksi," Koran Tempo, August 1, 2001, p. 1.
46 "When Will this Boring Game End?," TEMPO, April 9, 2001, p. 27.
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by the president."47 Wahid the delegative democrat predictably declined, insisting that 
"staff appointments should not be taken out of his hands." With this final act of 
stonewalling on the issue the party cartel cared about most, Wahid's fate was sealed as 
far as parliament was concerned.
The special session was indeed secured in late May 2001, at which point the 
November 11 Caucus apparently degenerated into little besides a command center for 
cabinet negotiations. TEMPO reported, a bit prematurely, that "an agreement has been 
reached on sharing out the seats in Mega's new cabinet among the parties."48 Defense 
Minister Mahfud MD, a PKB stalwart, remarked bitterly: "Now we hear that PDI-P has 
started to form a cabinet lineup." In reality, the process was still very much ongoing, 
with Kwik Kian Gie remaining at the center of the process. "He has discussed the new 
cabinet with chairs of the large parties . . . The concept at first is a grand coalition 
government, based on the balance of votes in the legislature." Informal discussions on 
constitutional memoranda had thus shifted seamlessly to informal discussions on how 
to carve up the next cabinet. Months before Wahid's impeachment was finalized, 
collusive democracy was being frantically restructured behind closed doors.
But delegative democracy was not dead yet. To the contrary, Wahid dove ever 
deeper into delegative democracy's bag of tricks. It is instructive at this point to return 
briefly to O'Donnell. When a delegative democrat becomes stifled by elite opponents, 
he is generally left with two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, options. The first is to 
mobilize mass support behind the personage of the president. This does not in and of 
itself constitute a return to authoritarian rule, in O'Donnell's view, but it certainly 
undermines the significance of democratic institutions. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez 
provides an ideal example, while the Philippines' Joseph Estrada fits the general mold 
as well.49 A second option, best exemplified by Peru's Alberto Fujimori, is the auto- 
golpe, or "self-coup." Here, a president enlists the support of loyalists in the military to 
crush parliament rather than simply circumventing it. When leaders cross this regime- 
type Rubicon, says O'Donnell, delegative democracy loses what little democratic 
credibility it still enjoyed.
For all its undeniable quirks, Wahid's response to the second parliamentary 
memorandum showed powerful harmonies with both of these common tricks.50 He 
was able to mobilize mass support: ten thousand radical Wahid supporters in 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) torched PDIP offices in East Java on May 28, leading to the 
arrest of nineteen Wahid followers. Recognizing that he needed more muscle to defeat 
the party cartel's impeachment efforts, Wahid reshuffled his cabinet on June 1, largely 
in an effort to gain tighter control over the military and police. One major casualty of 
the shakeup was Bimantoro, the chief of national police, whom Wahid evidently 
perceived as having cracked down too hard on his NU rowdies in East Java. Another
47 This and following quote come from "Crisis in Slow Motion," TEMPO, May 28, 2001, p. 25.
48 Source of quotes in this paragraph, ibid.
49 In Estrada's case, bribery apparently succeeded in defeating official impeachment procedures, but the 
transparently fixed outcome led Estrada's opponents to mobilize first. Only after Estrada had been forced to 
abdicate did his own popular forces counter with their own street actions.
50 The pertinent details in the following discussion are drawn from "Last Throw of the Dice," TEMPO,
June 11, 2001, pp. 16-18; and "What's Behind the Reshuffle?," TEMPO, June 11, 2001, p. 21.
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was coordinating security minister SBY, who had apparently offended Wahid by 
promising that the military would defend parliament's upcoming special session from 
a potential onslaught by NU militants bussed in from East Java.
To drum up broader mass support and strike a bigger blow at his strongest 
enemies, Wahid also suddenly tried to get his reformasi groove back. The day before 
reshuffling his cabinet, Wahid met with an NGO alliance called Lindas Orba, or the 
National Anti-New Order Coalition. This was a prelude to Wahid's sacking of 
Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, a Golkar member who, while personally 
independent of Akbar Tandjung, had apparently disappointed Wahid by failing to 
bring New Order liber-crony Ginanjar Kartasasmita to justice. Marzuki's replacement 
was Baharuddin Lopa, the "untouchable"-style prosecutor who had brought Suharto's 
crooked son Tommy to book. (Only weeks after his appointment, Lopa would die 
under mysterious circumstances in Mecca.) Nearly two years after Wahid had 
strategically decided to cooperate with a vast party cartel rather than a more limited 
reformist coalition, he tried to return to the spirit of Ciganjur to save his own neck.
Unfortunately for Wahid, the spirit of Ciganjur-Plus had lived on in the informal 
elite networks that defined the post-New Order polity, while the initial spirit of 
Ciganjur had never become embedded in concrete elite arrangements. As mentioned 
above, the second Ciganjur meeting had combined military elements with party leaders, 
whereas the first had witnessed the possible birth of a party coalition that did not 
depend directly on military support. It was clear on the night of the NU-PDIP riots in 
East Java that Wahid would not simply lose power to the party cartel, but to a party 
cartel drawing strong support from the military. That same evening of May 28, 
Megawati was personally visited by SBY, TNI Chief Widodo A.S., sacked police chief 
Bimantoro, and new security chief Agum Gumelar. Meanwhile, no fewer than thirty- 
two police generals signed a statement condemning Wahid's sacking of Bimantoro.51 
Since Wahid was now left with neither mass nor military support in his conflict with 
parliament, his dangerous flirtation with delegative democracy was effectively 
finished. The challenge for the party leaders who overturned him then became one of 
reconstituting the party cartel of 1999 under more reliable leadership. With one part of 
the accountability trap averted, Indonesia prepared to plunge straight back into the 
other.
Recrafting the Ruling Cartel: Megawati's Cabinet and the Political Moratorium
Wahid's impeachment was celebrated by parliamentary elites in an atmosphere of 
unabashed glee and unmasked collusion. On July 31, a festive gathering was held at 
parliament to permit the Lorum Lintas Lraksi to bask in the post-impeachment glow. 
An official statement of the cross-party group was delivered by PDIP parliamentary 
leader Arifin Panigoro and his PBB counterpart, Ahmad Sumargono, declaring that 
"the fraction leaders are committed to continuing their close cooperation, just as they
51 If Wahid crossed the Rubicon with parliament by reshuffling the cabinet, he did so with the military and 
police by interfering in their internal appointment processes as well. See Siddharth Chandra and Douglas 
Kammen, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation," World Politics 55 (October 2002): 96-136.
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have closely cooperated up until now."52 Arifin gave special thanks to the military 
representatives in parliament for their support: "During the first memorandum, the 
TNI/Polri fraction truly took a firm stand, as they did during the special session as 
well." When a journalist asked Sumargono if party elites were acting a bit too "drunk 
on power" by having such a celebration after as somber an occasion as an 
impeachment, the PBB leader staunchly defended the cause for celebration. "The 
fractions in parliament have just succeeded in overcoming a major source of instability 
in the very heart of our nation's political life."
While Sumargono was right to say that the impeachment of Wahid had been 
accompanied by instability, this had taken place almost entirely at the elite level. When 
mass unrest did arise, it was in defense of Wahid, against the actions of parliament. 
Sumargono's insinuation that parliament had somehow succeeded in bridling some 
broader source of political instability was at best disingenuous, and at worst 
dangerous. The notion that the co-optation of all potential opposition groups is 
necessary to prevent societal tensions has become a recurring theme in Indonesian 
political discourse in the post-Suharto era. How well it harmonizes with New Order 
claims that only elites could practice politics without resorting to violence should be 
rather self-evident.
Even more than the birth of the party cartel at the special parliamentary session in 
1999, its rebirth at the special parliamentary session in 2001 was marked by a sense that 
no one had truly lost. Even Wahid's own PKB parliamentary fraction had been invited 
to the f§te, with no apparent sense of irony. "We're not in a framework of winners and 
losers," Sumargono claimed, as a winner might be expected to do. Amien Rais echoed 
the sentiment, if with more rhetorical flourish: "There are no losers in this matter, 
because the real winners here are the Indonesian people."53
While that sentiment was debatable, it was undeniable that the original party cartel 
of 1999 was back in command, this time sans Wahid. But as in all cartels, a shared 
interest in the victory of the whole does not eliminate each party's interest in 
maximizing its share of the spoils. This was precisely why the Forum Lintas Fraksi and 
November 11 Caucus had worked so tirelessly and painstakingly on preparing the 
details of a Megawati cabinet, literally for months before Wahid's removal. Such cross­
party meetings had often dragged on "until dawn,"54 one parliamentary leader 
reported.
Rather audaciously, participants in these informal sessions had endorsed a precise 
mathematical formula for dividing up cabinet seats, initially proposed by PAN's 
Bambang Sudibyo—Wahid's former finance minister, who had bragged he could 
"work with anybody."55 New President Megawati was said to have agreed to the
52 This and following quotes in the paragraph come from "Srimulat," Koran Tempo. If one wanted to pick 
two Indonesian parties that are as different as possible, to prove that all parties were willing to work as 
one, it would be hard to do better than the PBB and PDIP.
53 Both quoted in "Syukuran Lintas Fraksi MPR/ DPR," Kompas, August 1, 2001, p. 6.
54 "Srimulat," Koran Tempo.
55 Kwik Kian Gie subsequently pushed Megwati to reappoint Bambang as finance minister, again 
suggesting the staying power of informal networks established during the impeachment process. See 
"Berebut Tanggung Jawab atau Duit?," TEMPO, August 5, 2001, pp. 26-27.
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formula in principle, which gave ten points for the presidency, six for the vice­
presidency, four for the finance ministry, three for the interior ministry, and so on. The 
total figure added up to one hundred, so dividing up the key positions was effectively 
a matter of transposing each party's share of the 1999 parliamentary vote onto an 
organizational flowchart of executive posts.56
But as so many economists have learned the hard way, political struggles cannot be 
reduced to technical fixes through mere quantification. Once the power of appointment 
was placed in the hands of Megawati (who appears to have little stomach for hard 
political bargaining) and her husband Taufik Kiemas (who appears to enjoy a 
voracious appetite for same), the temptation to gain an extra edge for PDIP favorites 
was enormous. More to the point, the opportunity to use the power of presidential 
appointment to slip out of the grip of the parliamentary party cartel was even bigger 
for Megawati than it had been for Wahid. Not only did the PDIP have a much stronger 
position in parliament than the PKB. There was also no way that parliament would 
have embarked on another high-stakes impeachment gamble if Megawati had reneged 
on her apparent pledge to bring all parties that helped overthrow Wahid into her new 
cabinet. The tensions between collusive democracy and delegative democracy are not 
merely personal—they are profoundly structural.
The most important division that emerged was between PDIP and Golkar. First, 
efforts by Akbar Tandjung to win the vice-presidency were thwarted when PDIP 
parliamentarians backed the PPP's Hamzah Haz, a far less talented politician with a far 
weaker party base in parliament. As in 1999, Akbar's attempt to secure the number- 
two position was partly stymied by mass opposition, in the form of student protests 
against his candidacy. At a PDIP meeting just days before the vote, party opposition to 
Akbar became so strong that the party agreed to vote him down unanimously. "All 
agreed to say 'no' to Akbar Tandjung. The Golkar Chairman was considered to be a 
potential burden on the Megawati presidency."57
While opposition to Akbar was unanimous, an instructive division emerged within 
PDIP concerning which vice-presidential candidates to support in his stead: Hamzah 
Haz or SBY. Experience with cross-party dialogue appeared to have an important 
causal effect. Those PDIP members most closely involved in such meetings were 
inclined toward Hamzah, while more hardcore nationalists blanched at his Islamist 
reputation and preferred SBY.58 Once again, it appeared that informal cross-party 
networks had similar levels of influence in the Indonesian parliament as the parties 
themselves.
Yet the fight over the relatively kering vice-presidency paled by comparison to 
struggles over the more basah seats in the cabinet. In spite of the painstaking informal 
preparations for a Megawati cabinet that had preceded Wahid's removal, 
reconstituting a cartelized cabinet proved to be an extremely contentious and drawn-
56 For detailed discussions of the formula's political implications, see "Kabinet Baru, Harapan Baru?," 
TEMPO, August 5, 2001, pp. 20-21; and "Skor Pembagi Kue," Gatra, August 4, 2001, p. 28.
57 "Hamzah Haz, Merdeka!," TEMPO, August 5, 2001, p. 24. PDIP made no secret of its opposition to 
Akbar. By writing "Hamzah Haz, Merdeka!" on their secret ballots, they signaled to the gallery—and to 
Akbar—that the votes were from PDIP. Personal communication with Rizal Sukma, August 2001.
58 Ibid.
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out process. The biggest fights appeared to arise over the biggest prizes: the economic 
ministries. To most observers, the key question was whether Megawati would grant 
those vital posts to party favorites or to respected technocrats for the sake of economic 
recovery. This was no doubt important, and no doubt a factor that weighed on the new 
president's mind. But this treatment of the controversy tended to miss a deeper 
political point: namely, that access to such ministries would provide potential financial 
bonanzas to the individuals and parties who controlled them.
Because some cabinet seats are more equal than others, struggles over those seats 
introduce a zero-sum element to political negotiations that cross-party forums have 
difficulty managing. As a result, Megawati needed to postpone the official 
announcement of her new cabinet on several occasions, even as financial markets 
panicked amid justifiable "speculation that squabbling among political parties has 
worsened."59 Akbar Tandjung, a central player in the negotiations despite his snubbing 
by Megawati in the vice-presidential race, insisted that the cartel was not breaking 
down: "The main point is we support the new government." But Wahid supporter 
Mahfud MD reasonably suggested that parties were probably stalling the process by 
demanding "to be accommodated proportionally in the Cabinet in accordance with 
their role in ousting Abdurrahman Wahid." He also rightly raised the possibility that 
Megawati might try her own hand at delegative democracy if the parties refused to 
accept her choices. "Megawati might turn to the Indonesian Military . . .  to fill key 
positions," indeed as many as half of all positions by Mahfud's rough estimation.
While Mahfud's observations were obviously not those of a disinterested party, 
they did not exactly come from a complete outsider either. He had been privy to such 
negotiations on previous occasions and was intimately familiar with the main players' 
bargaining strategies. Having served under Wahid, Mahfud recognized the delegative 
temptations that come from confronting a demanding party cartel. Megawati did not 
take the drastic measures Mahfud thought she might; but the fact that they seemed so 
possible suggests that delegative democracy is indeed a presidential Sword of 
Damocles hanging over Indonesian politics.
In the final analysis, Megawati gave the party cartel most of what it asked for. 
While journalists tended to rave at the fact that the two major economic postings 
wound up in technocratic hands,60 they failed to recognize that the new kabinet gotong- 
royong followed the November 11 Caucus's mathematical guidelines almost to a tee.61 
The most notable divergence from the formula was that Golkar and the PDIP each 
received five mainline ministries, whereas the formula had suggested that Golkar 
deserved a 6-4 edge. (Each received one coordinating ministry, as predicted.) For all 
the "inherent distrust"62 that supposedly characterized Golkar-PDIP relations as a
59 All quotes in this paragraph are from "Haggling Stalls Cabinet Making," The Jakarta Post, August 3, 2001,
p. 1.
60 John McBeth, "A Parade of Surprises," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 23, 2001.
61A chart for the "pure" mathematical version is provided in "Skor Pembagi Kue," Gatra, August 4, 2001,
p. 28.
62 John McBeth and Djini Djalal, "The Puppet President," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 2, 2001, p.
16. Quite intriguingly, this article also speculates that the main rift delaying the cabinet selection was 
between Arifin Panigoro and Kwik Kian Gie: the PDIP grandees in charge of the Forum Lintas Fraksi and 
November 11 Caucus, respectively. It will require further research to determine (1) whether this tension
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remnant of New Order rivalry, Megawati and Taufik Kiemas had clearly agreed on 
terms with Akbar Tandjung that Golkar must have found extremely agreeable. All 
other party fractions received seats as well, with the partial exception of PKB, which 
expelled leader Matori Abdul Djalil before he accepted the Defense Ministry post. 
However, PKB has not used its relative exclusion from state patronage to position itself 
as any sort of parliamentary opposition; and after the party endorsed Golkar nominee 
Wiranto in the 2004 presidential sweepstakes, no one expects the party to go willingly 
into opposition anytime soon.63
If Megawati gave substantial ground to Golkar, she did not fail to seize some big 
prizes of her own. Most notably, while observers were busy praising the new president 
for her political courage in appointing technocrats to the top economic posts, Megawati 
pulled a stupendous bait and switch. At the very first meeting of her new cabinet, she 
announced that authority over the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was 
being shifted from the finance ministry to the ministry of state-owned enterprises.64 
This took the disposal of approximately US$1.3 billion in assets out of the hands of a 
reputed technocrat, and placed it into the hands of Laksamana Sukardi, the PDIP's 
long-time treasurer and "a close confidante of Megawati."65 Laksamana now controlled 
not only IBRA, but the ministry of state-owned enterprises, one of the most basah in the 
Indonesian bureaucracy. Yet this was generally perceived in positive rather than 
negative terms, since Laksamana was reputed to be "one of Indonesia's few genuine 
reformers." While foreign media at least raised the question of whether IBRA would 
"be turned into a money-making opportunity for the PDI-P in the run-up to the 2004 
elections," local press coverage focused entirely on the implications of the switch for 
economic rather than political concerns: i.e. how it would affect the efficiency of asset 
disposal, and whether it might lead to costly bureaucratic infighting.66
Three years later, well-informed sources suggest that Laksamana's clean reputation 
has counted for less than the obvious political temptations of such concentrated 
bureaucratic power. While investigations into the disposal of IBRA's assets are still 
ongoing,67 initial perceptions are that PDIP indeed benefited immensely from its long­
time treasurer's discretion over the flows of such copious state funds. On a more 
personal level, two long-time friends of Laksamana expressed disappointment to me
was real or only rumored; and (2) whether it related to their respective roles in those informal forums 
before Wahid's dismissal.
63 Matori himself suggested that the PKB's official stance against joining the cabinet was mere posturing. 
"This is a problem that sometimes makes me feel fed up," he said. "They yell and yell that they want to be 
in the opposition and don't want to be in the cabinet, b u t . .  . then they ask me to talk to Megawati about 
giving PKB three ministries and five director positions in state-owned enterprises." See "Kutipan," Koran 
Tempo, August 1, 2001, p. 15. This begs the question of whether some Indonesian parties are more 
desperate to join the cabinet than others because they lack access to other types of resources. For instance, 
PKB is tightly linked to NU, which may provide the party with succor in times when PKB cannot gain 
access to wealth via the cabinet. In a very different vein, Golkar holds so many local executive positions off 
Java that it might need cabinet access less than a party such as PAN or PPP.
64 IBRA's Indonesian name was Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional, or BPPN.
65 This and subsequent quotes come from John McBeth, "A Parade of Surprises."
66 "Untuk Naikkan Penjualan Aset, BPPN Dialihkan ke Menteri Negara BUMN," Koran Tempo, August 13, 
2001.
67 Interview with Luky Djani, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Jakarta, July 19, 2004.
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that someone they had so long respected as a reformer would behave as he did when 
disposing of IBRA assets.68 While neither accuses Laksamana of having enriched 
himself personally, his reputation as a loyal backer of PDIP and Megawati makes it 
hard to believe that IBRA-related funds did not flow into party coffers and into the 
president's 2004 reelection campaign fund.69 Indeed, it is a matter of public knowledge 
that PDIP has significantly outspent all of its competitors in the current election season. 
The example of Laksamana Sukardi should thus serve notice that cabinet 
appointments involve a great deal more of political import than whether or not 
ministers are personally honest or claim to be champions of reform.
Although the consensus on the cabinet was a challenge to craft, it proved to be an 
easy bargain to sustain. Megawati's ascent to her rightful place upon her father's 
former throne, and her calculation that sharing her cabinet among all groups who put 
her there was the best way to keep her there, have ushered in an era of remarkable elite 
camaraderie. In contrast to Wahid's frequent reshuffles, Megawati has left the cabinet 
alone—so much so, in fact, that when Defense Minister Matori was incapacitated by a 
stroke, Megawati preferred to keep the post vacant rather than stir up a political 
hornet's nest by appointing a successor.70 In short, an unmolested cabinet has meant a 
tranquil parliament. Ginanjar Kartasasmita nicely captured the elite gestalt of 
Megawati's first half-term, perhaps feeling flushed with the recognition that Wahid's 
impeachment had rescued the former Suharto minister from persistent criminal 
investigations:
We have entered a new phase. The atmosphere among the people is now like it 
was two years ago . . . The atmosphere of conflict, so tumultuous before now, has 
suddenly subsided. Support is flowing from everywhere. Throughout the 
country, the society is almost unanimous in giving support to this new 
partnership [Megawati-Hamzah].71
The Cartel Faces the Voters: Dealignment, Direct Elections, and a Disrupted Elite
At least that was how things looked from the cozy confines of Senayan.72 Between 
Megawati's inauguration in July 2001 and the official start of election campaigning in 
March 2004, Indonesian party elites found precious little to disagree about, at least in 
public. Opposition became effectively non-existent. "Parties may take an oppositional 
stance on a specific issue," Bivitri Susanti notes. "But they don't adopt an oppositional
68 Personal communications, June-July 2004. While any confidential source must perforce be treated with 
caution on my part and healthy skepticism on the reader's, I can go so far as to say that neither source is a 
figure with clear partisan interests, and therefore neither has anything obvious to gain by besmirching 
Laksamana's reputation.
69 One personal informant has told me that Wahid sacked Laksamana as finance minister in April 2000 
because he was perceived as more loyal to Megawati than to the president, and as someone trying to 
enhance the PDIP's position in the ministry more generally. Personal communication, July 2001. The same 
point about non-partisanship expressed in the previous footnote applies here as well.
70 Thanks to Benny Subianto for pointing this out.
71 Ginanjar Kartasasmita, "Pasca-Gus Dur: The Do's & The Don'ts," Gatra, August 4, 2001, pp. 36-37.
72 The area of Jakarta where parliament is located.
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attitude in general."73 Like all cartels, Indonesia's party cartel grew less responsive as it 
gained immunity from competition. The lack of vigorous leadership typically ascribed 
to aloof Megawati applied equally well to party elites in parliament. The entire 
government, not just the presidency, appeared to be on auto-pilot.
Three changes occurred during this "political moratorium," however, that altered 
the political landscape in the run-up to the April 2004 parliamentary election. The first 
was the gradual coalescence of Golkar and the PDIP into something of an unofficial 
political combine. Anchored by the warming relationship between Akbar Tandjung 
and presidential husband Taufik Kiemas, relations between the two parties had gone 
way beyond thawing; PDIP red and Golkar yellow seemed to be melting 
indistinguishably into a common pool of mucky orange.74 Recalling one of the 
vignettes with which I opened this essay, one might call this process the Manado- 
ization of Jakarta politics.
That politics had been largely contained in the comfortable surroundings of 
Senayan certainly helped cement this tightening bond. As by far the two largest parties 
in parliament, Golkar and PDIP were masters of the house. With so little of ideological 
consequence to fight about, and so much shared interest in accessing the burgeoning 
patronage opportunities of the parliament, the pretense of party difference became 
harder to sustain. By late February 2004, Taufik made the rather peculiar election-year 
move of admitting that PDIP was basically indistinguishable from Golkar, even though 
Suharto's old ruling party remains a hated holdover from the New Order to many 
Indonesians. When pressed to say whether this meant Akbar Tandjung had become an 
acceptable partner to most PDIP members, Taufik responded as if national politics had 
been reduced to nothing more than the sum total of his own personal relationships: 
"Pak Akbar is a friend of mine."75
Less than two weeks later, the emergence of a ragtag alliance of student and labor 
groups called 'The Anti Mega-Akbar Tandjung Movement" suggested how linked the 
parties were starting to appear in at least some quarters. According to the group's 
leader, Megawati's failure to provide political backing for Akbar's corruption 
conviction proved that she was "a traitor to reformasi,” and that "the PDIP-Golkar 
alliance must be confronted by a united opposition group."76 The growing Golkar- 
PDIP partnership may have made sense as a lubricant for day-to-day parliamentary 
business. But it was bound to cost the PDIP support among voters who still fondly 
associated the party with opposition to Suharto's New Order.
Had party elites been playing closer attention to the political ground, they might 
have noticed that society at large was more restless than its ostensible representatives.
73 Interview with Bivitri Susanti, Executive Director of the Pusat Studi Hukum and Kebijakan Indonesia 
(PSHK, Indonesian Center for Legal and Policy Studies), Jakarta, July 21, 2004.
74 The biggest exception to this emerging detente helps prove the rule. Backbenchers from PDIP pushed for 
Akbar to be inactivated after his initial conviction on corruption charges in September 2002, but their 
petition was dead on arrival, garnering only sixty-eight signatures. Thanks to Dirk Tomsa for relating this 
story. For the basics on the Akbar scandal, see Rachel Langit, "Akbar verdict: A glimmer of light," Asia
Times, September 5, 2002.
75 "Taufik Kiemas: Golkar dan NU Punya Platform Sama Dengan PDIP," Koran Tempo, February 28, 2004.
76 "Gerakan Oposisi Serukan Anti Mega-Akbar," Koran Tempo, March 11, 2004.
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This was best reflected in the second big change that took place during Megawati's 
first half-term: the grassroots civil-society movement in favor of constitutional 
reform.77 Most importantly for the analysis here, this movement pressed for the 
introduction of direct presidential elections as a means of reimposing some semblance 
of vertical accountability on the increasingly rarefied political elite. By 2002, the notion 
of direct elections had become so obviously popular among voters that no party 
wanted to be seen as the force stonewalling the initiative. By the time the issue made it 
to parliament, party fractions found themselves relegated to finding ways to tweak the 
reforms to their narrow advantage, rather than trying to stop the tide of demands for 
constitutional reform altogether.
This second change paved the way for a third. In March 2004, as elections fast 
approached, Megawati suffered a falling out with her coordinating minister for politics 
and security, SBY, after her husband Taufik publicly referred to him as "childish." If 
Taufik's warm remark toward Akbar Tandjung had been the most ill-advised political 
comment in recent memory, his nasty remark toward SBY far surpassed it in terms of 
bad political judgment. With a bang, Minister SBY was transformed into Candidate 
SBY.
This third change (the Megawati-SBY split) was not merely the product of Taufik's 
loose tongue. It was more fundamentally a product of the second development 
mentioned above (direct elections). For all his apparent brains, brawn, and presidential 
aura, SBY had faced a glass ceiling under the post-Suharto disposition, in that he was a 
military man rather than a party man. When SBY finished third behind lesser mortals 
Akbar Tandjung and Hamzah Haz in the 2001 vice-presidential race, SBY attributed 
the loss to electoral rules rather than any personal flaw. "In Bambang's [SBY's] eyes, 
the result of the vice-presidential election in parliament shows a basic reality of 
politics," TEMPO reported at the time. "It points to the extremely important role of 
political parties. As a result, he says, people who belong to no party will have a hard 
time penetrating that blockade."78 The introduction of direct presidential elections had 
made this party blockade easier to penetrate, at least in terms of formal rules. Whether 
informal norms at the elite level can sustain the cartel against an SBY challenge—and 
indeed, whether those norms will prevent SBY from challenging it at all—is perhaps 
the most important mystery in Indonesia's ongoing presidential and coalitional 
politics.
For the initial parliamentary vote of April 5, however, SBY still needed a party 
label. Rather than jumping to a major party with a major leader, SBY joined a barely 
breathing party vehicle, the PD, which warmly welcomed his leadership as a cheap 
ticket from pretender to contender status. As mentioned above, the two main surprises 
in the April parliamentary vote were (1) the PDIP's plummeting vote share, and (2) 
milder dealignment more generally, as all five major parties lost ground vis-a-vis their 
performances in 1999. The party cartel had clearly not done as thorough a job of 
marginalizing small outside parties as it would have hoped; and the PDIP clearly 
received the brunt of the blame for the lackluster performance of Megawati's 
government, anchored though it was in a kabinet pelangi.
77 The following text gratefully draws on a conversation with Bivitri Susanti from PSHK.
78 "Meneropong Para Calon," TEMPO, August 5, 2001, pp. 22-23.
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What was immediately evident was that the PD and PKS were the big gainers from 
this dealignment process. To be sure, the sudden rise of each could arguably be seen 
more as a trend toward political deformasi than reformasi. While PKS's well-deserved 
reputation as a hard-working grassroots machine has earned it a wide degree of 
immediate admiration/9 its apparent disingenuousness regarding its long-term 
Islamist intentions has also made it a source of significant trepidation.79 80 As for PD, Bill 
Liddle fairly concluded that, "The Democrat Party doesn't exist, really. A voter for the 
Democrat Party is a voter for SBY."81 In point of fact, PD does have other elite figures 
on board, but has understandably chosen not to call much attention to them, given 
their unsavory New Order backgrounds. Besides former President Habibie's brother 
Fanny, PD also counts among its top figures a former PDI member from its Soerjadi 
days, while party chairman Subur Budhisantoso had been a high-ranking Golkar 
official during the time of Harmoko. Budhisantoso defended his party cohorts by 
insisting, rather colorfully, that the past was the past: 'This party is like a wastebasket. 
But that doesn't mean we don't have principles."82
More importantly for SBY, the upcoming direct elections permitted him to cast 
aside his party label and make his run for the Istana on a more individual than 
institutional basis. Yet the month following the parliamentary vote was not so much a 
time for personalized campaigns aimed at the mass of voters, as one might expect from 
direct presidential elections; rather, party elites moved directly into their familiarly 
opaque coalition-building mode, tirelessly holding private silaturahmi to discuss which 
presidential/vice-presidential tickets would compete in the July 5 vote. With only one 
month to make such tickets official, the buzz of coalition politics was louder in Jakarta 
than it had been since the formation of Megawati's cabinet in August 2001.
Rather than attempting to detail the web-like patterns of elite wheeling and dealing 
that accompanied the crafting of presidential/vice-presidential pairings, I hope it will 
suffice say the following: If one were to write the names of Indonesia's top fifteen or 
twenty political elites on a single page, and draw lines between every pair that met 
behind closed doors at some point during April 2004, the latticework of linkages 
would have few if any gaps. Everyone seems to have strongly considered pairing up 
with virtually everyone else at some point during the process. Deserving of special 
note is the fact that all five eventual vice-presidential nominees were wooed at one 
point by multiple presidential candidates. The mathematical possibilities for coalitional 
pairs in a cartelized setting proved to be virtually endless. Golkar's Jusuf Kalla, who 
decided to pair up with SBY over Megawati, and perhaps other suitors as well, 
captured the promiscuity of the process perfectly: "I'm kind of like a monkeywrench," 
he laughed. "I can fit with anybody."83
79 The joke that PKS stood for Partai Kantong Sendiri—loosely, Self-Funding Party—seems more 
complimentary than dismissive, especially when compared to the epithet aimed at Wahid's PKB: Partai 
Kaya Baru, or Party of the New Rich.
80 As one prominent non-Muslim scholar prognosticated, with obvious discomfort: "PKS is the party of the 
future." Personal communication, July 2004.
81 Comments at a public forum, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, April 16, 2004.
82 "Tiga Menguak Takdir," TEMPO, April 12-18, 2004, p. 26.
83 "Saling Silang Mencari Sekondan," TEMPO, April 19-25, 2004, p. 27.
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All five tickets that emerged were fronted by figures with deep experience 
operating at or near the center of the party cartel: SBY, Megawati, Wiranto, Amien 
Rais, and Hamzah Haz. Four of the five (not Hamzah) could trace their cooperation all 
the way back to Ciganjur-Plus in January 1999; all five had been closely involved in the 
rise of Abdurrahman Wahid, while all except Wiranto had been centrally implicated in 
his fall, as well as tightly embedded in the subsequent Megawati coalition. If SBY was 
an outsider, he could only claim to have been so for a grand total of one out of the past 
sixty-three months. This is important to keep in mind when considering the likelihood 
that a President SBY might try to reinstate a more presidential style of delegative 
democracy at the expense of the interests of this party cartel.
Coalition-building for the first presidential round primarily took the form of vice- 
presidential selections. Since all the main parties except PKB had their own candidates 
in the running, there was little room for attracting big-party endorsements. The big 
prize was thought to be PKB, with its links to the NU mass base; both Megawati and 
Wiranto bid for this vote by selecting vice-presidential candidates from (rival wings of) 
the NU. In the only other endorsement of much significance, PKS stood behind Amien 
Rais, whose PAN serves as PKS's partner in the Fraksi Reformasi in parliament. This 
was a rare moment of a party seemingly sticking to its ideological guns, although it did 
not go unchallenged. A significant minority in the PKS preferred to back Wiranto, but 
was voted down in what appeared to be a refreshing instance of intra-party democracy 
at work.
Meanwhile, even more sheen was rubbed off of SBY's outsider pretensions, insofar 
as his "monkeywrench" running mate was a Golkar member who had long served 
beside SBY as one of the coordinating ministers in Megawati's cabinet. Amien's 
longshot campaign did a moderately better job of maintaining a reformist veneer with 
its selection of Siswono Yudhohusodo, a seemingly well-respected figure in the worlds 
of politics and business despite his deep roots in the New Order.84 But Amien had 
already done his waning reformist image untimely damage by publicly stating early in 
the campaign that he hoped to attract a military man as his running mate.85 By 
expressing this desire but failing to make the match, Amien clumsily managed to 
attract the opprobrium of anti-military groups without attracting any support 
whatsoever to compensate.
84 Siswono claimed to prefer Amien as a partner, due to what he called his "good, clean, reformist track 
record." But Wiranto is his frequent golf partner, and Siswono clearly did not reject his advances out of 
hand. "I also respect the offers from other parties. If I accept one offer, what about the other offers? It's 
really something I have to think about." See "Siswono Juga Mengaku Dilamar Wiranto," Koran Tempo, 
April 28, 2004. Indeed, Siswono's New Order roots appear rotten as well as deep. He was especially 
notorious for his hardline views on East Timor and on the economic role of the Chinese, even though they 
clearly did little to encumber his personal enrichment under Suharto. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer 
at Indonesia for pressing this point.
85 In an extremely frank interview, Amien talked freely of his own "monkeywrench" quality. Calling any 
potential pairing with another Islam-oriented politician "political incest" [English], Amien said he needed 
a running mate with nationalist credentials. "Pragmatically, I can't look for leading figures in Megawati's 
camp. So finally I've turned my attention to TNI, because we can't doubt their nationalism and 
patriotism." Amien went on to note that he and SBY are "old friends" and that he and Agum Gumelar (the 
former general who was apparently Amien's second choice behind SBY) often played basketball together 
in Yogya and Solo. See "Amien Rais: 'Pemilu Presiden Merupakan The Last Battle,"' TEMPO, April 19-25, 
2004, pp. 43-46.
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To put it mildly, then, the first round of presidential voting did not offer any 
obvious alternative for opponents of the status quo, as embodied by the PDIP-Golkar- 
led party cartel. Nevertheless, turnout was quite high, as SBY and Megawati moved on 
to the second round. At the five voting stations I observed with an Asia Foundation 
monitoring team in Cawang, east Jakarta—where vote totals and turnout figures quite 
closely mirrored those in Jakarta as a whole—the atmosphere broadly suggested a 
sense of purposefulness and enthusiasm, given that this was the first time voters had 
been entrusted with choosing individual candidates at the national level. The final 
tallying of ballots was greeted with universal applause, and not just partisan shouts 
from victorious SBY supporters. For once, it appeared to be a chance for non-elites to 
feel, with their new direct electoral powers, as if they could all be on the winning 
side.86
While it is analytically dangerous to infer voter moods, what appears rather clear is 
that voters felt less beholden to the dictates of party machines than many observers 
expected. Most notably in East Java, where PKB and NU were presumed to rule the 
roost, SBY pulled off an upset victory over Megawati and Wiranto, both of whom were 
backed by NU running mates. Similarly, Golkar's endorsement did relatively little 
good for Wiranto in eastern Indonesia—where the Golkar machine is presumably 
strongest—as voters went more heavily for SBY and his Makassar-based running mate. 
Several analysts have gone so far as to claim that this rejection of party dictates 
represents a full-blown pembangkangan massa, or mass rebellion against party elites.87 
Even if only partly true, this raises fascinating comparative questions, given the 
seemingly more tenacious hold of local "bossism" in electoral politics in Thailand and 
the Philippines.88
For purposes of the present analysis, the key point is that direct elections have 
shaken party elites' confidence in their own mobilizational capacities. This raises the 
prospect that coalitional politics might play a surprisingly limited role in the second
86 This anecdotal evidence was echoed in conversations with far more seasoned observers from the Asian 
Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and the locally based Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (KIPP, 
or Independent Committee of Election Observers). Still, one can clearly not assume that electoral 
atmospherics in Jakarta were nationally representative. Melbourne University researcher Dirk Tomsa 
described the voters he observed in South Sulawesi as "disillusioned," with "hardly any enthusiasm 
discernible." Personal communications, July-August 2004.
87 See, for instance, the interview with Sukardi Rinakit in "Pertarungan Wibawa dan Popularitas," Kompas, 
July 17, 2004, p. 8. It is also commonly and contrarily asserted that the major party machines remain 
robust, but that elite splits prevented them from functioning effectively in the first round of presidential 
voting. The significance of such splits in the machines' underperformance is indeed undeniable; but this 
might well reflect a deeper problem of adjustment to the introduction of direct elections, not merely a 
temporary aberration.
88 Two especially notable works would be John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); and James Ockey, "Crime, Society, and Politics in 
Thailand," in, Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, ed. Carl A. Trocki (Ithaca, NY: CorneE 
University Southeast Asia Program, 1998). My own sense is that the key to variation might rest in the fact 
that Indonesian local bosses tend to be party bosses, while their Thai and Philippine counterparts are 
rarely creatures of any wider party machine. In such a context, direct elections might prove quite locally 
liberating. For a useful corrective to overly pessimistic views of Philippine elections, see Benedict J. Tria 
Kerkvliet, "Contested Meanings of Elections in the Philippines," in The Politics o f  Elections in Southeast Asia, 
ed. Robert Taylor (New York, NY: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1996).
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round of presidential voting in late September. A close political adviser to the 
Muhammadiyah movement explained the group's decision not to endorse either 
candidate in the September vote: 'They realize that if they try to tell people what to do, 
they'll wind up looking like fools."89 No doubt the embarrassing failure of NU elites to 
guide their minions in the July vote served as a cautionary tale to their 
Muhammadiyah counterparts.
The big questions then become: Will this initial outbreak of modesty intensify 
among political elites, leading them to withhold electoral support from both 
candidates? Or, conversely, will SBY or Megawati decide that party elites who claim 
the power to mobilize their members are mere "fools," and refuse to trade cabinet seats 
for the electoral equivalent of a pig in a poke? If so, will this leave the winner with a 
freer hand to craft what SBY intriguingly calls a koalisi terbatas, or limited coalition, 
rather than an expansive cartel in which opposition entirely vanishes? If major parties 
are indeed excluded from the cabinet, will they come to adopt constructive 
oppositional roles? Or will they try to undermine rather than check the presidency, 
renewing the distracting and destructive elite conflict of the Wahid years?
Whither Accountability? Formal Rules vs. Informal Networks and Norms
This brings the discussion full circle, back to the accountability trap. Prospects that 
Indonesian politics will remain mired in a condition of collusive democracy, or, 
alternatively, return to flirtations with delegative democracy, seem to depend 
primarily on how the clash between formal and informal politics is resolved.
At the level of formal rules, there is simply no denying that the next president 
should have an immensely stronger hand in dealing with parliament. His or her 
mandate will come directly from the voters rather than from Senayan. Impeachment 
has been made more difficult by the 2002 constitutional reforms. And for all the talk 
among party elites about the need for the next president to have a "strong position in 
parliament" for the sake of social stability, this is little more than thinly disguised 
blackmail. Social unrest has only arisen over national elite politics in the post-Suharto 
era because parliament tried to deny power to a leader with mass support, not because a 
president played too rough with parliament.90 If SBY or Megawati has the courage to 
form a cabinet that denies access to Golkar and other major parties, will parliament 
dare to try to knock that chip off the new president's shoulder?
While coalitional politics surrounding the September election is still inchoate, one 
pattern seems unmistakable: Megawati is willing to grant greater concessions to other 
members of the party cartel in advance of the vote than is SBY. Having finished well 
behind SBY in the first round, and lacking SBY's popular and personal appeal,
89 Interview with Rizal Sukma, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, July 23, 2004.
90 The two instances to which I refer are the PDIP riots upon Megawati's denial of the presidency in 
October 1999, and the NU riots in May 2001 as impeachment proceedings against President Wahid gained 
momentum.
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Megawati is plainly more desperate for elite support. By contrast, as SBY ponders the 
costs and benefits of building a coalition, he is thus far "not selling for cheap."91
Yet this might well change. Kusnanto Anggoro presents an original and intriguing 
argument for why SBY would have little choice but to give into parliamentary 
demands for a large role in the next cabinet, even if he does not receive electoral 
endorsements from those parties. The point is not that the scorned party cartel would 
express its wrath through impeachment, but that it could poison the bureaucracy 
against President SBY. "The President cannot make appointments below the first 
level," notes Kusnanto. "So from the second level down, it's all New Order people," 
with longstanding formal and informal ties to party elites in Golkar and PDIP. Even if 
SBY could countenance the prospect of an uncooperative parliament in matters of 
policy decisions, could he tolerate being unable to implement policy as well? In sum, 
Kusnanto agrees that recent changes in formal rules should give either SBY or 
Megawati more leeway. But given the robustness of old informal networks linking 
party and state, most political elites seem to have reached a different conclusion: 'The 
mentality is that there will continue to be a dictatorship of the parliament."92
There are other reasons to believe that informal politics might prevent even a 
partial dismantling of the party cartel. For one, the old assumption that the cabinet is 
generally basah, while parliament is relatively kering, appears no longer to ring true. To 
be left in the parliament does not mean being left out of highly lucrative patronage 
networks. This suggests that even if the next president manages to exclude major 
parties from the next cabinet, the wounds may be salved by helping arrange plum 
positions on parliamentary commissions. This practice already appears to be becoming 
institutionalized, as parliament's thirteen standing committees currently divvy up their 
chairmanships as follows: PDIP and Golkar have four each, PPP has two, while the 
remaining three are allotted to PKB, TNI/Polri, and Fraksi Reformasi. In parliamentary 
commissions as in the cabinet, everyone is in, and no one is out.
These commissions appear to be a consummate example of the informal 
conquering the formal. Officially, Bivitri Susanti notes, their seats are supposed to be 
apportioned according to straightforward criteria reflecting parties' overall strength in 
parliament, while chairmanships are only supposed to entail basic gavel-swinging 
authority.93 But since these impersonal rules have no grounding in concrete personal 
relationships, real practice looks rather different. Informal negotiations can place 
strategic players on the most basah committees (i.e. budget, trade and industry, finance 
and banking, and energy and mineral resources), providing ample opportunities for 
lower-ranking members to be included in parliament's circuits of money politics.94
Just as importantly, committee chairmanships provide more informal benefits than 
their formal powers imply. This suggests that such posts can be shared—via the same 
logic as cabinet posts—to prevent political opposition from emerging. 'The Chairmen
91 Interview with P. Partogi Nainggolan, Center for Research and Information Services (Pusat Penilitian 
dan Pelayanan Informasi, or PPPI) at the Indonesian Parliament, Jakarta, July 23, 2004.
92 Interview with Kusnanto Anggoro, CSIS, Jakarta, July 23, 2004.
93 Interview with Bivitri Susanti, PSHK, Jakarta, July 21, 2004.
94 Thanks to Luky Djani at Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) for his insights on parliamentary 
commissions.
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are like the conductors of the orchestra," says parliamentary researcher P. Partogi 
Nainggolan.95 In a setting where formal rules of procedure are yet to become 
effectively institutionalized, committee chairmen largely determine the order of 
business, making them potentially powerful gatekeepers. With so many patronage 
opportunities at hand, one wonders whether even the best-intentioned party 
leadership could discipline its members into serving as a vocal opposition in 
parliament, rather than quietly joining in on the take.
A second informal barrier to the cartel's demise is the recent political background 
of the two presidential candidates. As noted earlier, both SBY and Megawati have been 
major players in Indonesia's charmed inner circle since Ciganjur-Plus in January 1999. 
From a comparative perspective, when more collusive forms of democracy have come 
under attack elsewhere from delegative-style presidents (and, more rarely, prime 
ministers), these challengers have normally emerged from outside the traditional 
political elite. For instance, recent delegative democrats such as Thaksin Shinawatra, 
Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, and Silvio Berlusconi have parachuted into politics 
from the world of business; others, such as Joseph Estrada and Hugo Chavez, have 
used charismatic mass appeal and backing from anti-establishment elements in the 
military to challenge ruling cartels. SBY and Megawati have precious little in common 
with such figures. Running roughshod over the party cartel would imply running 
roughshod over longstanding coalition partners, if not necessarily partisan favorites.
If the informal can truly be expected to conquer the formal, the 2004 presidential 
election probably means very little in structural terms. Indonesia will likely remain 
trapped as a collusive democracy, with little prospect for a near-term escape. Yet if 
Abdurrahman Wahid once became convinced, against all evidence to the contrary, that 
he might succeed in trampling any and all institutions designed to ensure horizontal 
accountability, might not a President SBY similarly pursue his own, less fanciful 
delegative dreams? The fact that delegative democracy almost universally fails does 
not mean that it is not frequently attempted. If SBY sticks to his early campaign pledge 
to avoid the dagang sapi process until after his electoral mandate has been 
secured—and his formal bargaining power over the party cartel thus expanded 
exponentially—he might prove willing to use popular and/or military support as 
leverage against hostile elements in the bureaucracy and parliament alike.
The 2004 runoff election might thus represent something quite structurally 
consequential, even if at the level of the two individual candidates it appears to be little 
more than a face-off between two very familiar figures with indistinguishable policy 
platforms. It might well represent a fundamental clash between two very 
different—yet similarly dysfunctional—democratic structures. A Megawati victory 
would most likely mean extremely little reshaping of the party cartel, and a 
continuation of collusive democracy. If anything, the fact that Megawati would almost 
certainly be ineligible to run for another presidential term in 2009 would make her 
even less accountable to popular concerns than she has been to date.
The prospect that SBY would govern with popular concerns in mind is at least 
somewhat more promising, not because he differs from Megawati as an individual, but 
because he would presumably ascend to the presidency at least somewhat less
95 Interview with P. Partogi Nainggolan, PPPI, Jakarta, July 23, 2004.
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beholden to the party cartel than Megawati would be. The downside is that this also 
means that SBY is far more likely to try to govern via the delegative path, wreaking 
havoc with Indonesia's post-Suharto political institutions before they have assumed 
solid form. Alternatively, SBY might avoid such confrontation and share power with a 
reconstituted party cartel. His choice of strategy might well depend on which of his 
informal networks is stronger: his factional ties with military elites, or his coalitional 
ties with the party cartel.
More optimistically, it is conceivable that the coalitional disruptions accompanying 
SBY's candidacy might open structural opportunities for more robustly 
representational forms of politics. The point is not whether SBY has strong democratic 
credentials per se; the point is that his run for the presidency has both sparked deep 
tensions within Golkar and called the cementing of the Golkar-PDIP alliance into 
question. If Golkar and PDIP had been intent on continuing to share power after the 
2004 elections, as appeared rather obvious earlier this year, who besides SBY could 
have prevented this rather dismal prospect from becoming reality? In sum, a 
significant opposition appears much more likely to emerge from an SBY victory, if only 
because he is more likely to feel sufficiently emboldened to shape his coalition as he 
sees fit, and to force a party as large as PDIP into an oppositional stance.
Once some party or group of parties becomes forced to think of itself as an 
opposition group—even if forced to do so kicking and screaming—it will then have to 
consider how best to regain access to government power. If a critical mass of PDIP 
parliamentarians comes to recognize that they initially won overwhelming popular 
support by appearing to oppose the New Order, then lost it by appearing to betray 
those principles, narrow self-interest might prompt the party to work to revitalize its 
mass base.96 Similarly, PAN might reflect on its shoddy performance vis-a-vis its 
closest coalition partner, PKS, and decide that a combination of elite opposition and 
mass constituency services would be the best way to win popular support. In sum, PKS 
and SBY might not be alone for long in taking their political acts to the streets.
Yet no one should expect Indonesian party elites to take such steps under anything 
but severe duress. This begins, but does not end, with the credible threat that popular 
dissatisfaction might translate into their exclusion from direct access to Jakarta's vast 
reservoirs of power and patronage.97 Collusive democracy as recently experienced fails 
to meet this basic standard. Delegative democracy might restore some sense of 
oppositional activity and vertical accountability, but only at the considerable risk that 
Indonesia's experiment with democratic politics might degenerate into virtual one- 
man rule, or even be reversed entirely. Under either scenario, low-quality democracy 
will create ideal conditions for direct military intervention. From this perspective, 
escaping the accountability trap is not only important for improving Indonesian 
democracy, but perhaps for preserving it as well.
96 One incoming PDIP parliamentarian expressed hopes to me that the party might indeed try to recapture 
what she sees as its reformasi roots. Personal communication, July 2004.
97 As the SBY-PKS comparison that launched this essay suggests, parties often find it easier to win mass 
support by broadcasting media images than by building stronger grassroots organizations. For a fine 
discussion of factors influencing such party strategies, see Doug Perkins, "Structure and Choice: The Role 
of Organizations, Patronage, and the Media in Party Formation," in Party Politics 2,3 (1996): 355-375. Like 
Katz and Mair's analysis, Perkins's article draws heavily on Martin Shefter's seminal work.
